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ESSAY 
TINKERING AROUND THE EDGES: 
THE SUPREME COURT'S DEATH PENALTY JURISPRUDENCE 
John D. Bessler* 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not squarely confronted the death penalty's 
constitutionality since the 1970s.ln that decade, the Court actually ruled both ways 
on the issue. In McGautha v. California, 1 the Court first held in 1971 that a jury's 
imposition of the death penalty without governing standards did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause? But then in 1972, in the land-
mark case of Furman v. Georgia,3 the Court interpreted the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause to hold that death sentences-as then applied-were unconsti-
tutional.4 In that five-to-four decision, delivered in a per curiam opinion with all 
nine Justices issuing separate opinions,5 U.S. death penalty laws were struck down 
as violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 6 The sentences of the 
"capriciously selected random handful" of those sentenced to die, one of the 
Justices wrote, are "cruel and unusual in the same way being struck by lightning is 
cruel and unusual."7 Other Justices also emphasized the arbitrariness of death 
sentences, 8 with some focusing on the inequality and racial prejudice associated 
with them.9 
Four years later, the Supreme Court reversed course yet again, approving once 
more the use of executions. 10 After thirty-five states reenacted death penalty laws 
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he previously taught at The George Washington University Law School and the University of Minnesota Law 
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DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2012). © 2013, 
John D. Bessler. 
I. 402 u.s. 183 (1971). 
2. !d. at !96. 
3. 408 u.s. 238 (1972). 
4. /d. at 239-40. 
5. David R. Dow, The Last Execution: Rethinking the Fundamentals of Death Penalty Law, 45 Hous. L. REv. 
963, 966 (2008). 
6. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240. 
7. /d. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
8. /d. at 248 n.l1, 251-53 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-95,305 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
9. /d. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
10. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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in the wake of Furman, 11 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of death 
penalty statutes in Gregg v. Georgia12 and two companion cases. 13 The Court 
ruled that laws purporting to guide unbridled juror discretion-and requiring 
capital jurors to make special findings 14 or to weigh "aggravating" versus "mitigat-
ing" circumstances 15-withstood constitutional scrutiny. 16 The Court in Gregg 
emphasized that the Model Penal Code itself set standards for juries to use in death 
penalty cases. 17 Only mandatory death sentences, the Court ruled that year, were 
too severe and thus unconstitutional. 18 In its decision in Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 19 the Court explicitly ruled mandatory death sentences, the norm in the 
Framers' era,20 were no longer permissible and had been "rejected" by American 
society "as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid."21 
This Essay examines America's death penalty forty years after Furman and 
provides a critique of the Supreme Court's existing Eighth Amendment case law. 
Part I briefly summarizes how the Court, to date, has approached death sentences, 
while Part II highlights the incongruous manner in which the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause has been read. For instance, Justice Antonin Scalia--one of 
the Court's most vocal proponents of "originalism"-has conceded that corporal 
punishments such as handbranding and public flogging22 are no longer constitution-
ally permissible; yet, he (and the Court itself) continues to allow death sentences to 
be imposed.23 The American Bar Association ("ABA") has yet to fully weigh in 
11. JOHN D. BESSLER, Kiss OF DEATH: AMERICA'S LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 60 (2003). 
12. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. 
13. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
14. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272. 
15. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 164-66. 
16. See Jose Felipe Anderson, Punitive Damages vs. The Death Penalty: In Search of a Unified Approach to 
Jury Discretion and Due Process of Law, 79 UMKC L. REv. 633, 640 n.25 (2011) (discussing state statutes 
enacted in the wake of Gregg v. Georgia and Jurek v. Texas). 
17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976). Notably, the Model Penal Code's death penalty 
provisions, cited in Gregg, no longer exist. In October 2009, the American Law Institute ("ALI") withdrew the 
Model Penal Code's death penalty provisions "in light of the current intractable institutional and structural 
obstacles to ensuring a minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment." Carol S. Steiker & 
Jordan M. Steiker, No More Tinkering: The American Law Institute and the Death Penalty Provisions of the 
Model Penal Code, 89 TEX. L. REv. 353, 354 (2010). 
18. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
19. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280. 
20. /d. at 289 ("At the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the 
common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses."). 
21. I d. at 293. By the early 1960s all death penalty jurisdictions had adopted discretionary sentencing schemes, 
replacing their automatic death penalty statutes with statutes designed to channel juror discretion. /d. at 291-92. 
22. Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 881,884 n.lO 
(2009) (noting that the Eighth Amendment has been found to prohibit "[t]he barbaric punishments condemned by 
history, 'punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs 
and the like'") (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,272 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)); see also Dolovich, 
supra, at 920 (''The deliberate infliction of corporal harm has long since been rejected in the United States as a 
form of legitimate punishment."). 
23. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 853-54,862-63 (1989). 
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against the death penalty, though it has taken notice of the bevy of problems 
associated with it.24 The ABA's two death penalty-related projects/5 as well as the 
justice system's considerable experience with capital cases, plainly show that the 
reality of the death penalty's administration differs substantially from consider-
ation of capital punishment in the abstract.26 
Modem American society is very different from American life in the eighteenth 
century, yet executions, though increasingly rare, remain. This is so even though 
other harsh bodily punishments once used and tolerated in the penal system-
among them, ear cropping and the pillory-have not been used for many 
decades?7 Part III highlights the rarity of American executions in the 21st century 
24. The ABA does not take a position supporting or opposing capital punishment. But in 1997, the ABA called 
for a moratorium on executions until the death penalty can be "administered fairly and impartially, in accordance 
with due process." ABA Endorses Moratorium on Imposition of Death Penalty, 60 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1434 
(Feb. 12, 1997); Margery Malkin Koosed, Averting Mistaken Executions by Adopting the Model Penal Code's 
Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 41,45 n.7 (2001) ("The ABA House 
of Delegates voted for a moratorium until all jurisdictions conformed to previously adopted ABA policies aimed 
at ensuring fairness and impartiality in the administration of capital punishment."); see also American Bar 
Association, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 
31 HoFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) (discussing the 2003 newly adopted guidelines for the performance of defense 
counsel in capital cases). In August 2006, the ABA urged every jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to 
implement policies and procedures to ensure that offenders with severe mental disorders or disabilities not be 
sentenced to death or executed. Anthony E. Giardino, Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death 
Penalty: Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury, 77 FoRDHAM L. 
REV. 2955, 2956 (2009). 
25. The ABA's Death Penalty Representation Project, created in 1986, recruits volunteers to handle death 
penalty cases and works to ensure death row inmates receive effective legal representation. Bryan A. Stevenson, 
The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 699, 720 n.98 (2002). The ABA's Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project, established in 2001, 
investigates death penalty systems in the U.S. and seeks to implement the ABA's call for a moratorium on 
executions. Celestine Richards McConville, Yikes? Was I Wrong? A Second Look at the Viability of Monitoring 
Capital Post-Conviction Counsel, 64 ME. L. REv. 485,496 n.75 (2012). 
26. See Editorial, Public Should See Reality of Capital Punishment, USA TODAY, May 17, 1994, at lOA ("In 
the abstract, the death penalty appeals to many as a tidy way of disposing of society's garbage. In the flesh, the 
death penalty is barbaric. A televised version of reality may make that case best of all."). America's death penalty 
system, as studies and judicial decisions have repeatedly shown, is riddled with error, racial discrimination, and 
incompetent counsel, all of which make the death penalty more reminiscent of a state-run lottery than a rational 
system of justice. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Los Tocayos Carlos, 43 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 711 
(2012); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the 
Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REv. 573 (discussing racial discrimination by capital jurors during death 
sentencing); Steven M. Pincus, "It's Good to Be Free": An Essay about the Exoneration of Albert Burrell, 28 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 27 (2001); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003: Is the Death 
Penalty on Life Support?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 201,207 (2004) (noting that law professor and litigator Anthony 
Amsterdam has said the death penalty as administered is essentially a lottery: "[I]t's very much the luck of the 
draw in terms of the prosecutor, the judge, the jury"). 
27. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,427 (1885) (noting that Congress abolished the pillory in 1839); Hadix v. 
Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 591-92 (W.D. Mich. 2006)(same); State v. Cannon, 190A.2d 514, 517 (Del. 1963) 
(noting the abolition of branding and cropping of ears); W. J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization 
of Correctional Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REv. 829, 829 (1987) ("In 1829 the 
Tennessee General Assembly, in accordance with a national reform movement, abolished traditional methods for 
the punishment of crimes. Imprisonment replaced whipping, branding, and stocks."); Daniel E. Hall, When 
1916 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1913 
along with the public's heightened unease with them, while Part IV summarizes 
the Framers' similar unease towards death sentences. Although corporal and 
capital punishments were meted out in eighteenth-century America, many Fram-
ers, history reveals, were fascinated by the potential of penitentiaries and the 
viability of alternatives to capital punishment. Many of America's founders, in 
fact, were heavily influenced by Cesare Beccaria's 1764 treatise, On Crimes and 
Punishments, which spoke out against torture and executions in favor of life 
sentences.Z8 After Part V describes the continued and growing ambivalence of the 
American public toward executions-ambivalence shared by many U.S. jurists-
this Essay concludes that the U.S. Supreme Court should declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional. 
I. THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIONS 
Since the 1970s, the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have skirted the issue of 
whether executions are unconstitutional per se.Z9 Instead of focusing on whether 
executions are "cruel" and have become "unusual" as a factual and legal matter, 
the Justices have preferred to leave the issue of capital punishment largely to 
juries, legislative bodies, and executive branch officials.30 Even when confronted 
with credible statistical proof showing a persistent pattern of racial bias in capital 
sentencing proceedings, the Court refused to strike down death sentences as 
unconstitutional.31 In considering the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection 
Clause, Justice Lewis Powell's majority opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp ruled that 
the Georgia inmate, Warren McCleskey, whose fate was at stake, had failed to 
Caning Meets the Eighth Amendment: Whipping Offenders in the United States, 4 WIDENER J. PuB. L. 403, 
421 n.103 (1995) ("The Act of February 28, 1839, abolished whipping and standing in the stocks.") (citing Act of 
Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 5, 25 Stat. 321, 322 (1839)); Brian Hauck et al., Capital Punishment Legislation in 
Massachusetts, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 479, 481 n.16 (1999) ("In 1805, the Massachusetts legislature abolished 
whipping, branding, the stocks, and the pillory."). For a history of advocacy against corporal punishments, see 
MYRA C. GLENN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CORPORAL PuNISHMENT: PRISONERS, SAILORS, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN IN 
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA (1984) (discussing campaigns against corporal punishment in America during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). 
28. ADOLPH CASO, WE, THE PEOPLE: FORMATIVE DOCUMENTS OF AMERICA'S DEMOCRACY 14 (1995); FRANCIS 
LIEBER, ED., ENCYCLOPAEDIA AMERICANA: A POPULAR DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERPJURE, HISTORY, 
PoLITICS AND BIOGRAPHY 24-25 (1830). Instead of "life-without-parole sentences," Beccaria, Bentham, Black-
stone, and America's founders themselves spoke in terms of "perpetual imprisonment," "permanent penal 
servitude," or "perpetual slavery." JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEIITH PENALTY AND 
THE FOUNDERS' EIGHTH AMENDMENT 36-37,43,49,71,86-87 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL]. 
29. Over the years, a number of Justices have expressed reservations about executions or particular death 
penalty laws. See generally MICHAEL MELLO, AGAINST THE DEIITH PENALTY: THE RELENTLESS DISSENTS OF 
JuSTICES BRENNAN AND MARSHALL (1996) (discussing how only Justices William Brennan and Thurgood 
Marshall consistently viewed executions as per se violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when 
they were on the bench). 
30. Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 51 DUKE L.J. I, 41-42 (2007); Robert Weisberg, Deregulating 
Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REv. 305,305 (1983). 
31. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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show discrimination "in his case.'m While forthrightly conceding that the statisti-
cal evidence presented33 "indicate[d] a discrepancy that appears to correlate with 
race," Justice Powell rejected McCleskey's claim?4 "Apparent disparities in 
sentencing," he wrote dismissively, in an opinion he would later wish he could take 
back, "are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system."35 
The closest the U.S. Supreme Court has come to reassessing the death penalty's 
constitutionality as a whole came in 2008 in Baze v. Rees?6 In that case, Kentucky 
death-row inmates challenged the state's three-drug lethal injection protocol, 
questioning the legality of the country's most prevalent method of execution?7 In 
particular, the inmates argued that Kentucky's protocol carried a significant risk 
that severe pain might result during an execution if the protocol was not properly 
followed. 38 Although executions around the country were temporarily halted 
pending a ruling in Baze/9 the Supreme Court flatly rejected the inmates' claims.40 
The Court made its ruling despite a Kentucky law barring veterinarians from 
using one of the lethal drugs, pancuronium bromide, to euthanize animals.41 The 
inmates, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote, "have not carried their burden of 
showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane 
lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, 
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.''42 In a separate opinion, Justice John 
32. /d. at 292. 
33. David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia 
Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983). 
34. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312. 
35. /d. Justice Powell, in his retirement, later expressed regret for his vote in McCleskey. James S. Liebman, 
Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. I, 100 
(2007). 
36. 553 u.s. 35 (2008). 
37. Every jurisdiction that uses the death penalty now authorizes lethal injection as a method of execution./d. 
at41. 
38. /d. at 49; see also id. at 53 (''Their claim hinges on the improper administration of the first drug, sodium 
thiopental. It is uncontested that, failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental that would render the prisoner 
unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of 
pancuronium bromide and pain from the injection of potassium chloride."). 
39. See Elisabeth Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens's Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A 
Fifth Gregg Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 783, 828-29 (2010) (discussing the 
Baze ruling). 
40. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 ("Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution-no matter how 
humane-if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure."). 
41. /d. at 58; id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Robert Batey, Reflections on the Needle: Poe, Baze, 
Dead Man Walking, 44 VAL. U. L. REv. 37, 47 n.58 (2009) ("Like potassium chloride, pancuronium bromide is 
also widely prohibited from use in animal euthanasia."). 
42. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). Since Baze, single drug lethal-injection protocols have been adopted 
in Arizona, Idaho, Ohio, and Washington. In addition, Texas and Georgia announced in July 2012 that they will 
use a single drug in lethal injections, and Missouri and South Dakota also now authorize lethal injections with one 
drug. Harvey Gee, Eighth Amendment Challenges After Baze v. Rees: Letha/Injection, Civil Rights Lawsuits, and 
the Death Penalty, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 217,239 (2011); PBS Newshour: Death Penalty: States Transition 
to One-Drug Executions (PBS television broadcast July 19, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ 
1918 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1913 
Paul Stevens lamented: "It is unseemly-to say the least-that Kentucky may well 
kill petitioners using a drug that it would not permit to be used on their pets."43 
In spite of the Supreme Court's hostility toward claims challenging the constitu-
tionality of executions as a general matter,44 the Court has been willing to 
consider-and in some cases, reevaluate-the constitutionality of certain types of 
executions. Not only has the Court limited unbridled juror discretion45 and 
invalidated individual death sentences in a variety of factual contexts,46 but-
utilizing its "evolving standards of decency" test-it has ruled that the U.S. 
Constitution forbids the execution of various categories of offenders.47 Since 
the mid-1970s, the Court has read the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
prohibit the execution of the insane,48 juvenile offenders,49 the mentally re-
rundown/20 12/07/death-penalty-states-transition-to-one-drug-executions.html; Brandi Grissom, Texas Will Change 
Its Lethal Injection Protocol, TEX. TRIBUNE, July 10, 2012, available at http://www.texastribune.org/texas-dept-
criminal-justice/death-penalty/texas-changing-its-lethal-injection-protocol/; Arizona Inmate Executed with Single 
Drug, BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 1, 2012), http://articles.boston.com/2012-03-0l/nation/31111201_l_execution-team-
execution-protocol-three-drug-protocol; State by State Lethal Injection, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited July 9, 2012). In Kentucky, a state court judge 
ordered Kentucky officials to consider using a one-drug protocol "[i]n light of recent developments in the use of 
the one-drug protocol in other states." Trial Order, Baze v. Kentucky Dep't of Corr., No. 04-CI-1094, (Franklin 
Cir. Ct. Apr. 25, 2012). Kentucky made the switch to a single-drug protocol in July 2012. One Drug Execution 
Protocol in Kentucky, ABC36 News WTVQ, Lexington, KY available at http://www.wtvq.com/contentllocalnewsl 
story/One-drug-execution-protocol-in-Kentucky/Ll..eXhL8LjOSwty2cAWahww.cspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
43. Baze, 553 U.S. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
44. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) ("We now hold that the punishment of death does not 
invariably violate the Constitution."); see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 47 (2008) ("We begin with the principle, settled 
by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional."). 
45. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988) ("Since Furman, our cases have insisted that the 
channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional 
requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."). 
46. E.g., Brad Honigman, Considering Cruelty: State v. Chappell, State v. Snelling, and the Cruelty Prong of 
the ( F)(6) Aggravator, 53 ARIZ. L. REv. 321, 326-27 (2011) ("The U.S. Supreme Court has declared aggravating 
factors unconstitutionally vague in several cases.") (citing Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. I (1990) (per curiam); 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)); Scott W. Howe, 
Race, Death and Disproportionality, 37 N. KY. L. REv. 213, 237 n.l72 (2010) (noting the Supreme Court 
"recently reversed two death sentences on Batson grounds") (citing Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); 
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)); Bradley A. MacLean, Effective Capital Defense Representation and the 
Difficult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661, 669 (2009) ("[I]n Wiggins v. Smith and Rompilla v. Beard, the Supreme 
Court set aside death sentences because of trial defense lawyers' failures to investigate and present mitigation 
evidence.") (citing Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 
(2003)). 
47. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 26.1(b) (3d ed. 2011) ("In addition to regulating the 
procedures for death sentencing, the Court has narrowed the categories of offenders and offenses subject to capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment."); see also Joanna H. D' Avella, Death Row for Child Rape? Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Under the Roper-Atkins "Evolving Standards of Decency" Framework, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 
129, 138-39 (2006) (explaining the creation and application of the "evolving standards of decency" framework). 
48. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,408-10 (1986); see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
49. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837-38 
( 1987) (holding it is unconstitutional to execute juvenile offenders under the age of sixteen). 
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tarded,50 non-homicidal rapists, 5 1 and those who neither kill nor attempt or intend 
to kill.52 With respect to juveniles and the mentally retarded, the Court even 
overturned its own precedents, issuing new rulings that have been given retroac-
tive effect.53 The Court previously allowed such offenders to be executed. 54 Even 
as it has restricted the death penalty's use, however, the Court has upheld the death 
penalty's constitutionality as a general matter55 and allowed death sentences for 
those who kill or show a "reckless indifference to the value of human life."56 
II. REEVALUATING EIGHTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW 
Because it has been forty years since Furman ushered in the death penalty's 
modern era, it is appropriate now to stop and ask a few questions. First, given what 
is now known about executions themselves, 57 how "humane" is any execution or 
any method of execution ?58 After all, the punishment of death is expressly 
calculated to take life, and executions, however carried out, lead to the same result: 
50. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
51. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,413 (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977). 
52. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982). 
53. Cara H. Drinan, Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REv. 51, 66 n.l08 (2012) (citing In re Morris, 328 
F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding Atkins applies retroactively); Wimberly v. State, 934 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 2005) ("The Roper v. Simmons decision also applies retroactively to cases on collateral re-
view .... ")); Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REv. 61, 93 (2011) ("[N]ew and retroactive 
capital eligibility rules, such as the Atkins v. Virginia bar on executing mentally retarded offenders, are frequently 
the bases for claims in successive petitions."). 
54. Roper overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Atkins overruled Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
u.s. 302 (1989). 
55. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) ("We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital 
punishment is constitutional."); id. at 63 (Aiito, J., concurring) ("[W]e proceed on the assumption that the death 
penalty is constitutional."); id. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("This Court has held that the death penalty is 
constitutional."). 
56. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). The Supreme Court has insisted that, in capital trials, defendants be 
allowed to introduce mitigating evidence. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,608 (1978). The Court has also stated 
that punishments that involve "torture" or a "lingering death" violate the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); In re Kemrnler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). In that category the Court has included 
burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, and the like. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 446. 
57. One of the leading U.S. scholars on methods of executions is Deborah Denno, who has written extensively 
on that topic. E.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IowA L. REv. 319 
(1997); Deborah W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineering of 
Death Over the Ceniury, 35 WM. & MARY L. RBv. 551 (1994); Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection 
Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 49 (2007); Deborah W. 
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and 
Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHio ST. L.J. 63 (2002). At a recent symposium on the topic, 
Professor Denno noted that Baze may not, in fact, be the last word on the constitutionality of lethal injection. 
"[T]here are limits to the Court's analysis," she wrote, "that suggest that it is by no means a definitive response to 
the issue of lethal injection's constitutionality." Deborah W. Denno, Symposium, The Letha/Injection Debate: 
Law and Science: Introduction, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 701,702 (2008). "Baze is so splintered," she pointed out, 
"that none of its seven opinions comprises more than three votes." /d. 
58. See Richard C. Dieter, Methods of Execution and Their Effect on the Use of the Death Penalty in the United 
States, 35 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 789,815 (2008) ("[L]ethal injections are viewed by many as a process replete with 
error, state mismanagement, and as a potential violation of human rights."). 
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an inmate's death. Not only can botched executions result in physical pain, 59 but 
the psychological torture associated with death sentences60 and prolonged61 and 
isolated stays on death row62 is arguably significantly greater than that associated 
with other Eighth Amendment violations.63 Second, in terms of the U.S. Constitu-
59. See Austin Sarat et al., Gruesome Spectacles: The Cultural Reception of Botched Executions in America, 
1890-1920, I BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUDIES I (2012) (detailing history of botched executions during late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries); Michael L. Radelet, Some Examples of Post-Furman Botched Executions, DE..:rn 
PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (Oct. I, 2010), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/some-examples-post-furman-
botched-executions (last visited Nov. 12, 2012); see also Emily Pokora, Should State Codes of Medical Ethics 
Prohibit Physician Participation in State-Ordered Executions?, 37 W. ST. U. L. REv. I, 13 (2009) ("Inadequate 
training and refusal of medical professional participation have led to a significant number of botched execu-
tions."). 
60. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[M]ental pain is an 
inseparable part of our practice of punishing criminals by death, for the prospect of pending execution exacts a 
frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the actual infliction of 
death."); see also Valle v. Aorida, 132 S. Ct. I, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay) (citing a study 
of Aorida death-row inmates finding that 35% of inmates attempted suicide and documenting the harsh and 
debilitating conditions pervading death rows); Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of 
Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, I 07 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1169 (2009) ("[T]here is no 
denying the mental anguish and terror that exists on death row."). 
61. Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1300 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of cert.) 
(''Today, condemned inmates await execution for an average of nearly 13 years."); Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 
1045, 1046 n.* (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing long stays on death row as "psychological 
torture"); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 
192 (2005) ("Lackey claims are named for the death row inmate who argued that execution of an inmate after a 
'lengthy' wait on death row violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on 'cruel and unusual punishments."'); RyanS. 
Hedges, Justices Blind: How the Rehnquist Court's Refusal to Hear a Claim for Inordinate Delay of Execution 
Undermines Its Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 74 S. CAL L. REv. 577, 581 (2001) ("[l]nordinate delay of 
execution may be viewed as a form of psychological torture that would have been held cruel and unusual by the 
framers of the Bill of Rights."); Sherida Hibbard, To Test, or Not to Test?: Problems with Post-Conviction Relief in 
Texas, 13 TEx. TEcH. ADMIN. L.J. 121, 124 (2011) (''The average time spent on death row in Texas is just over ten 
years."). Indeed, "[l]ife without possibility of parole has become the de facto punishment for a majority of the men 
and women under sentence of death, who will die in prison before they are executed." Semel, supra note 39, at 
837; see also id. at 837 n.245 (noting that, in California since 1978, thirteen men have been executed while 
seventy-three death-row inmates "have died of natural or other causes"). 
62. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: "Volunteers," Suicide and Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 
966 (2005) ("In virtually every state, death row inmates are 'locked down' in their cells for most of the day, have 
little or no access to educational or other prison programs, and experience great isolation and loss of 
relationships."); Tracy Hresko, In the Cellars of the Hollow Men: Use of Solitary Confinement in U.S. Prisons and 
Its Implications Under International Laws Against Torture, 18 PACE lNT'L L. REv. I, 3 (2006) (''The devastating 
psychological and physical consequences of solitary confinement have been recognized since the mid-1880s."); 
Hannah Robertson Miller, "A Meaningless Ritual": How the Lack of a Postconviction Competency Standard 
Deprives the Mentally Ill of Effective Habeas Review in Texas, 87 TEx. L. REv. 267, 271 n.33 (2008) (noting that 
death row inmates are often confined to their cells for twenty-three hours per day); Peter Scharff Smith, The 
Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & 
JusT. 441, 502 (2006) ("Solitary confinement can have serious psychological, psychiatric, and sometimes 
physiological effects on many prison inmates."). 
63. Eighth Amendment violations-or cognizable Eighth Amendment claims-have often been based on 
psychological or emotional distress. Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that allegation 
of strip search of male prisoner in front of female prison guards sufficed to state an Eighth Amendment claim if the 
search was "conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain"; "physical 
injury need not result for the punishment to state a cause of action, for the wanton infliction of psychological pain 
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tion itself, must executions-at this time, especially in light of how rare executions 
have become64 -be considered "cruel and unusual punishments"? These are 
questions the U.S. Supreme Court has not satisfactorily addressed to date, but that 
must be confronted head-on. 
The Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has already been aptly 
characterized as an "enigma"65 and a "mess."66 Such terms are fitting because, if 
for no other reason, corporal punishments are no longer used in America's penal 
system67 while capital punishment remains. In other words, bodily punishments 
less than death-such as the historically familiar penal sanctions of whipping, the 
stocks, and ear cropping-are no longer tolerated in American law while the death 
penalty continues to be employed, albeit sporadically, by the U.S. legal system.68 
The disarray of Eighth Amendment case law has also been rightfully emphasized 
over the past few decades because Supreme Court cases are so often overruled, 
is also prohibited"); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522-31 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (stating that severe 
"psychological" pain and trauma can violate the Eighth Amendment); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 
1522-25 (lOth Cir. 1992) (stating that placing a revolver to a prisoner's head without justification and threatening 
to kill the inmate creates an actionable Eighth Amendment claim based on "psychological injury"); Chandler v. 
Baird, 926 F.2d 1057, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding inmate's statement that ''I'm sure I was depressed from it" 
was sufficient, when coupled with allegations of harsh conditions of administrative confinement, to state a claim 
for violation of the Eighth Amendment standards for prison conditions); see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 
1, 16 (1992) (Biackmun, J., concurring) ("It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological harm-without 
corresponding physical harm-that might prove to be cruel and unusual punishment."); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 102 (1976) ("Our more recent cases ... have held that the [Eighth] Amendment proscribes more than 
physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized 
standards, humanity, and decency .... "') (citations omitted); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 
1993) ("[l]n order to withstand summary judgment on an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions a 
plaintiff must produce evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the 
challenged conditions."); Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 100 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that, where complaint 
alleged that a guard pointed a lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with instant death 
accompanied by racial epithets, "a prisoner retains at least the right to be free from the terror of instant and 
unexpected death at the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodians"); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1264 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[l]f the particular conditions of segregation being challenged are such that they inflict a serious 
mental illness, greatly exacerbate mental illness, or deprive inmates of their sanity, then defendants have deprived 
inmates of a basic necessity of human existence-indeed, they have crossed into the realm of psychological 
torture."). 
64. Since 1976, there have been 1314 executions in the United States. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., FAITS 
ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. [herein-
after FAITS ABOliT THE DEATH PENALTY]. Of those, 1075 have been in just one region-the South-and 599 of 
them have been in just two states, Texas or Virginia. /d. at 3. Texas alone accounts for 490 of the executions that 
have taken place since the Supreme Court permitted the resumption of executions in 1976. /d. 
65. JoLee Adamich et al., The Selected Cases of Myron H. Bright: Thirty Years of His Jurisprudence, 
83 MINN. L. REv. 239,254 (1998). 
66. Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475 (2005). 
67. The construction of prisons-as one commentator put it-"made possible the cessation of corporal 
punishment" and "now make[s] possible the cessation of capital punishment." Howard Bromberg, Pope John 
Paull/, Vatican II, and Capital Punishment, 6 AvE MARIA L. REv. 109, 145 (2007). In prior times, "[c]ommon 
non-lethal punishments included whipping, caning, branding, pilloring, ducking stools, public shaming, amputa-
tion, stockading ... and exile." /d. 
68. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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often in the span of just a few years. Such sudden shifts by the Court, prompted by 
changes in membership, evolving public attitudes, or otherwise, make Eighth 
Amendment decision-making seem ad hoc at best.69 The growing number of 
five-to-four Eighth Amendment rulings only highlights the contentious and contro-
versial nature of such legal disputes.70 
Even a cursory examination of the country's Eighth Amendment case law 
reveals its unprincipled character. For decades, the Eighth Amendment has been 
interpreted to protect prisoners from harm.71 Applying the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, the Court has barred prison officials from using excessive 
force72 and subjecting inmates to inhumane conditions of confinement.73 Courts 
have also read the Eighth Amendment to bar corporal punishments or bodily harm 
short of death.74 In Hope v. Pelzer,75 the Supreme Court characterized the 
69. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the introduction of a victim 
impact statement ("VIS") at the sentencing phase of a capital trial violated the Eighth Amendment. Booth and 
another VIS case, South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), were overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 
808 (1991). 
70. E.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (20 12) (five-to-four decision that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide 
offenders); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007) (five-to-four decision finding an incompetency standard 
was too restrictive to protect a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(five-to-four ruling holding that it is unconstitutional to execute offenders for crimes committed while under the 
age of eighteen), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (19S9)(permitting the execution of sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old offenders); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (five-to-four decision holding that 
twenty-five-year prison sentence due to three strikes law did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (same); Sumner v. Shuman, 
483 U.S. 66 (1987) (five-to-four ruling invalidating a Nevada law mandating a death sentence in all cases in which 
a prisoner is convicted of murder while serving a life-without-parole sentence); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (five-to-four decision ruling that mandatory death penalty laws violated the Eighth 
Amendment); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same). 
71. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,828 (1994) ("A prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial 
risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment."). In a 1993 case, the Supreme Court further 
emphasized: 'That the Eighth Amendment protects against future harm to inmates is not a novel proposition. The 
Amendment, as we have said, requires that inmates be furnished with the basic human needs, one of which is 
'reasonable safety."' Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also 
id. ("It would be odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in 
their prison on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them."). 
72. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 ("[T]he Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for 
example, use excessive physical force against prisoners.") (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)). 
73. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (201 I) ("A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, 
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized 
society."); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 ("The [Eighth] Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must 
provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates."') 
(citations omitted). 
74. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,579 (8th Cir. 1968) (Biackmun, J.) ("[W]e have no difficulty in reaching 
the conclusion that the use of the strap in the penitentiaries of Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third of 
the 20th century, runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment."); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 283-S4 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[l]t does not advance analysis to insist that the Framers did not believe that 
adoption of the Bill of Rights would immediately prevent the infliction of the punishment of death; neither did 
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gratuitous handcuffing of a shirtless inmate to a hitching post for hours at a time, 
which resulted in an inmate's dehydration in the hot Alabama sun, as an "obvious" 
Eighth Amendment violation.76 Yet, executions-the intentional taking of human 
life and a fate far worse-incongruously continue to be tolerated by the Supreme 
Court's case law.77 The Court has never adequately explained how the Eighth 
Amendment can protect prisoners from harm and intolerable conditions yet 
simultaneously permit their execution. Nor could it, frankly. 
The Supreme Court's decisions upholding the death penalty's constitutionality 
have made Eighth Amendment case law internally inconsistent and irreconcil-
able. Instead of focusing on the meaning of the terms "cruel" and "unusual" in the 
Eighth Amendment itself, the Court has applied its "evolving standards of 
decency" test,78 assessing whether a "national consensus" exists79 and attempting 
to gauge a "trend"80 or the "consistency of the direction of change" in state laws.81 
Yet, as regards executions, the fundamental questions to be asked are whether it 
is "cruel" to intentionally inject an inmate with lethal chemicals82 and whether 
executions-in a factual sense-have become too "unusual" to be allowed any 
longer. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 83 the Supreme Court itself stated in a moment of 
candor that the "evolving standards of decency" principle "requires that use of the 
death penalty be restrained."84 While the Court ruled there that "[i]n most cases 
they believe that it would immediately prevent the infliction of other corporal punishments that, although 
common at the time, are now acknowledged to be impermissible.") (citation omitted). 
75. 536 U.S. 730 (2002). 
76. I d. at 733-35, 737-38. 
77. The Supreme Court has denied stays of execution even in situations where a member of the Court has 
asserted that it is cruel to execute inmates after they have spent more than three decades on death row. Valle v. 
Florida, 132 S. Ct. I (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of stay) ("I have little doubt about the cruelty of so 
long a period of incarceration under sentence of death .... So long a confinement followed by execution would 
also seem unusual. The average period of time that an individual sentenced to death spends on death row is almost 
15 years."). 
78. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality opinion). 
79. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2022-23 (2010). 
80. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,433 (2008). 
81. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002) ("It is not so much the number of these States that is 
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change."); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 
(2005) ("[Wje think the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated."). 
82. Challenges to lethal injection protocols continue even as lethal-drug shortages have materialized because 
drug manufacturers are refusing to sell drugs to prison officials if those drugs might end up being used in 
executions. Erik Eckholm & Katie Zezima, States Face Shortage of Key Lethal Injection Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/20ll/Ol/22/us/22lethal.html; Ariane de Vogue, Drug Shortage Disrupts 
Lethal-Injection Mix, ABC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/death-penalty-drug-shortage-
disrupts-execution-lethal-injectionlstory?id= 13148874#.T2efSXbU7ck. In Maryland, an administrative law de-
cision actually halted that state's death penalty because of the failure to follow the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act in attempting to adopt a lethal injection protocol. Arnold Rochvarg, How 
Administrative Law Halted the Death Penalty in Maryland, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 119, 120-23, 127-29 (2007). 
83. 554 u.s. 407. 
84. I d. at 446. 
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justice is not better served by terminating the life of the perpetrator,"85 it did not 
establish a per se bar on executions. 86 Instead, it took the position that "resort" to 
the death penalty "must be reserved for the worst of crimes and limited in its 
instances of application."87 
Ill. THE RARITY OF EXECUTIONS AND THE GROWING UNEASE WITH THEM 
The death penalty is now meted out more on the basis of geography, race, and 
the poor quality of defense counsel88 than on the nature of the crime.89 State 
officials, due to the rarity of executions and their concerns about the way the death 
penalty is administered, are themselves increasingly reevaluating the need for 
death penalty laws in the first place.90 In one of his last acts as Pennsylvania's chief 
executive, Governor Edward Rendell-a long-time death penalty supporter-
wrote a letter to the state's General Assembly recounting that while he had signed 
119 death warrants since taking office in January 2003, not one execution had 
taken place in the state in the prior eight years.91 "[I]t seems to me," Rendell wrote, 
"that the time has come to re-examine the efficacy of the death penalty under these 
85. /d. at447. 
86. The Court in Kennedy held as follows: "Difficulties in administering the penalty to ensure against its 
arbitrary and capricious application require adherence to a rule reserving its use, at this stage of evolving 
standards and in cases of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take the life of the victim." /d. 
87. /d. at 446-4 7. Under international law, the worst of the worst crimes-genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes-are punishable by life imprisonment, not death, as the Rome Statute does not authorize the 
infliction of capital punishment. David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 997 (2008). In July 2012, United Nations 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon-like his predecessor-called on member states that still use the death penalty to 
abolish the practice. "The taking of life is too absolute, too irreversible, for one human being to inflict on another, 
even when backed by legal process," he said. Secretary-General calls on States to abolish death penalty, UN 
NEWS CENTRE (July 3, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsiD=42382&Cr=Human 
%20Rights&Crl =;see also Death Penalty Increasingly Viewed as Torture, UN Special Rapporteur Finds, Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsiD= 12685&LangiD= E ("States should consider whether using the death penalty per se 
fails to respect the inherent dignity of the person, causes severe mental and physical pain or suffering and amounts 
to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture, Juan E. 
Mendez, has said."). 
88. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Penalty Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst 
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). 
89. KENNETH WILLIAMS, MOST DESERVING OF DIW"H?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DE!JH PENALTY 
JURISPRUDENCE (2012); see also Eric Berger, On Saving the Death Penalty: A Comment on Adam Gershowitz's 
Statewide Capital Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 1 (2011) ("Since 2006, Texas has carried out nearly 
half of all executions nationwide."); id. at 2 ("[O]nly a few of Texas's 254 counties seek capital punishment with 
any regularity."); id. ("Other states, such as Pennsylvania and California, also have wide variations among 
counties' imposition of the death penalty, even among demographically similar counties."). 
90. Connecticut, Illinois, New Mexico, and New Jersey recently abolished capital punishment. Valena 
Elizabeth Beety, The Death Penalty: Ethics and Economics in Mississippi, 81 MISS. L.J. 1437, 1457 (2012); 
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders' Post-Atkins Claims of Mental 
Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. I, 138 n.738 (2011-2012). 
91. Letter from Gov. Edward G. Rendell to Members of the Pa. Gen. Assembly (Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/outgoing-pennsylvania-governor-urges-state-legislators-review-death-penalty. 
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circumstances."92 If "no avenue" could be found to "significantly shorten the 
time between offense and carrying out the sentence" without jeopardizing the 
"thorough and exhaustive" judicial review required, Rendell explained, he wanted 
legislators "to examine the merits of continuing to have the death penalty on the 
books-as opposed to the certainty of a life sentence without any chance of parole, 
pardon or commutation."93 
Governor Rendell's sentiments are far from isolated. In California, which has 
the country's largest death row,94 voters were asked in November 2012 to replace 
the state's largely dormant death penalty with life-without-parole sentences.95 As a 
result of a ballot initiative that gathered nearly 800,000 signatures,96 Californians 
had the chance to vote on whether to replace the death penalty with life-without-
parole sentences and allocate the financial savings to be achieved from abolition to 
solving murder and rape cases.97 In the lead up to that vote, California's death 
penalty had already ground to a halt while the state's governor, Jerry Brown, was 
embroiled in a legal skirmish over the state's lethal injection procedures.98 As the 
Buffington Post reported in April 2012: "In the state's latest effort to restart 
long-stalled executions in California, Gov. Jerry Brown ... ordered prison offi-
cials to explore using a single drug for lethal injections instead of three."99 
While Proposition 34, the California initiative to repeal capital punishment, was 
92. /d. 
93. /d. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when "a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue" and 
"life imprisonment without possibility of parole" is available as a sentencing option, due process entitles the 
defendant to inform the jury of his or her parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by 
counsel. Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 39 (2001); accord Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002); 
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 ( 1994 ). 
94. As of April I, 2012, California had 724 death row inmates. Since 1976, California has executed thirteen 
people. FACfS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 64, at 2-3. 
95. The SAFE California Campaign was supported by a coalition of law enforcement officials, murder 
victims' family members, and people who have been wrongfully convicted. About the Coalition, SAFE 
CALIFORNIA, http://www.safecalifornia.org/about/coalition (last visited Nov. 12, 2012). 
96. Press Release, SAFE California to Replace Death Penalty Submits 800,000 Signatures to Qualify for 
November Ballot (Mar. I, 2012), http://www.safecalifornia.org/downloads/Signatures-Filing-PR-SAFE-CA-
Campaign.pdf. 
97. The initiative sought to repeal the death penalty for persons found guilty of murder and replace death 
sentences with life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The initiative, which sought to create a 
$i00 million fund to help law enforcement agencies solve more homicide and rape cases, would have applied 
retroactively to persons already sentenced to death and required persons found guilty of murder to work in prison 
and to pay victims restitution. Attorney General of California, Initiative Statute 11-0035 for Death Penalty Repeal 
(Oct. 21, 2011 ), http://www.safecalifomia.org/downloads/2.l.A_titleandsummary.pdf. 
98. California, 720 on Death Row, May Go Through 2012 with No Executions, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.thecrimereport.org/archive/2011-11-ca-no-exec. In Oregon, Gov. John Kitzhaber also 
publicly announced in 2011 that he would not execute any of that state's death-row inmates for the remainder of 
his term. Editorial, Oregon Gov. John Kitzhaber Leads with His Conscience, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/20 11/nov/25/opinionlla-ed-death-20 111125. 
99. Paul Elias, Jerry Brown on Lethal Injections: Governor Urges Officials to Make Changes, HUFFINGTON 
PosT (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/26/jerry-brown-on-lethal-injections_n_l457632. 
htrnl. 
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narrowly defeated, recent national polls show that a majority of Americans prefer 
life-without-parole sentences to the death penalty. 100 California itself has not 
executed an inmate in more than six years, and the state's anti-death penalty 
initiative-known as the SAFE California Campaign-was led by Jeanne Wood-
ford, a former San Quentin warden who once oversaw executions in the state. 
Woodford now favors life-without-parole sentences, as does Donald Heller, a 
former prosecutor who wrote and once championed California's death penalty 
law. 101 Although death penalty opponents were disappointed by the outcome of 
California's ballot initiative, the rarity of executions in the state-a key fact for the 
judicial evaluation of the unusualness of executions--demonstrates how unusual 
executions have become. 
Like physicians and nurses, 102 lawyers and jurists have also begun more 
actively weighing in on America's death penalty. In Ohio, a justice of that state's 
supreme court, Paul Pfeifer, recently voiced opposition to the same death penalty 
law he helped draft as a young state senator. 103 "I have concluded that the death 
sentence makes no sense to me at this point when you can have life without the 
possibility of parole," he said in public comments. 104 Gerald Kogan, a retired chief 
justice of the Florida Supreme Court who once prosecuted capital cases, has also 
indicated recently that abolition should be considered, 105 while Justice Anthony 
Kennedy has himself recognized the anomaly of death sentences in relation to the 
Court's existing Eighth Amendment case law. 106 "When the law punishes by 
100. Howard Mintz, Defeat of Proposition 34: California's Death Penalty Battle Will Continue, SAN JosE 
MERCURY NEws (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/crime-courts/ci_21951068/defeat-proposition-34-
californias-death-penalty-battle-will ("[T]he 53-47 percent vote against Proposition 34 showed that California is 
moving toward abolition, given the fact more than 70 percent of the voters put the law on the books in 1978."). A 
poll conducted in 20 I 0 by Lake Research Partners found that 61% of respondents would choose a punishment 
other than death for murderers. FACTS ABOUT THE DEIUH PENALTY, supra note 64, at 4. The most popular 
alternative was "Life without parole plus restitution." !d. 
101. Howard Mintz, End death penalty measure likely to be on November ballot, SAN JosE MERCURY NEws 
(Mar. I, 20 12), http://www.nodeathpenalty.org/news-and-updates/end-death-penalty-measure-likely-be-november-
ballot. "It's been a colossal failure," Donald Heller said recently of the law he helped to put in place. 
Adam Nagoumey, Seeking an End to an Execution Law They Once Championed, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 6, 2012, 
at A I, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20 12104/07/us/fighting-to-repeal-california-execution-law-they-
championed.html?_r= 3&pagewanted = I &hpw. 
I 02. The American Medical Association has taken the position that members of the medical profession should 
not participate in executions. Nadia N. Sawicki, Doctors, Discipline, and the Death Penalty: Professional 
Implications of Safe Harbor Policies, 27 YALE L. & Pm.'Y REv. 107, 121 (2008-2009). The American Nurses 
Association has also called upon state licensing and disciplinary boards to treat participation in executions as 
grounds for disciplinary action. /d. at 124. 
I 03. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Justice Rejects Death Penalty Law He Wrote, ASSOCW"ED PRESs, Feb. 15, 




106. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (20 II) ("Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in 
all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment."); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) ("'The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
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death," Justice Kennedy wrote in 2008, "it risks its own sudden descent into 
brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint." 107 
The death penalty's history is one of successive restrictions on its use. 108 
England's monarchical "Bloody Code" once authorized executions for more than 
200 offenses, 109 but Great Britain-the country from which U.S. jurisdictions 
imported the "cruel and unusual punishments" language 110-no longer allows 
capital punishment. 111 Indeed, all of Europe has followed suit in barring execu-
tions as a matter of law. In the European Union, it is now considered a flagrant 
violation of human rights to carry out an execution, 112 and Canada, European 
countries, and other nations have refused to extradite offenders to the United States 
until assurances are obtained that the death penalty will not be sought. 113 
Even places like Rwanda, South Mrica, and Uzbekistan have done away with 
executions, 114 with South Africa's Constitutional Court issuing its decision declar-
ing executions unconstitutional in 1995.115 At a time when the world is turning its 
back on capital punishment, the incongruity of American executions is particularly 
pronounced, especially given that corporal punishments within American prisons 
are already a thing of the past. 116 The U.S. Supreme Court itself, ironically, has 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."' (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality 
opinion))). 
107. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,420 (2008). 
108. STUART BANNER, THE DEXfH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 3, 5-6, 8, 17-18 (2002). The death 
penalty--once administered in some of the most horrific ways imaginable-was previously used for all sorts of 
crimes. VICTOR STREffi, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 1-8 (3d ed. 2008). 
109. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 4 (3d ed. 2006). 
110. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 94. 
Ill. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 187 n.3 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Abolishing the death penalty has 
been made a condition of joining the Council of Europe, which is in turn a condition of obtaining the economic 
benefits of joining the European Union."); see also William W. Berry III, The European Prescription for Ending 
the Death Penalty, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 1003, 1014; Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, Abolishing the Death Penalty 
Worldwide: The Impact of a "New Dynamic," 38 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (2009). 
112. Protocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms established an absolute ban on the death penalty. No execution has taken place in a Council of Europe 
member state since 1997. Alice Izumo, Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture and Ill Treatment: European 
Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence, 42 COLUM. HUM. Rrs. L. REv. 233, 235-36 (201 0). 
113. Takuya Katsuta, Brown and Roper: The American South and the Supreme Court, 27 CoNN. J. lNT'L L. 
119, 142 (2011). 
114. Hood & Hoyle, supra note 111, at 1-2; Frederick C. Millett, Will the United States Follow England (and 
the Rest of the World) in Abandoning Capital Punishment?, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 547, 616 n.507 (2008); Megan M. 
Westberg, Rwanda s Use ofTransitional Justice After Genocide: The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR, 59 U. KAN. L. 
REv. 331,340 (2011). 
115. State v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at paras. 8, 10, 144-51 (S. Afr.). 
116. WILLARD M. OLIVER & JAMES F. HILGENBERG, JR., A HISTORY OF CRJME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 103, 300 (2d ed. 2010); JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 40-44 (9th ed. 2010). 
Corporal punishments were once regularly used in America's criminal justice system. See generally MARK 
COLVIN, PENITENTIARIES, REFORMXfORJES, AND CHAIN GANGS: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF PuNISHMENT IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 14, 29, 55, 135 (2000) (noting the use of corporal punishments); MARK E. KANN, 
PuNISHMENT, PRISONS AND PXTRIARCHY: LIBERTY AND POWER IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2005) (discussing 
how certain Framers, such as Benjamin Rush, were ambivalent about corporal punishment). 
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frequently condemned brutal and inhumane treatment of offenders within U.S. 
prison facilities. For example, in 2011, in finding unconstitutional overcrowding 
within California's prisons that created unsanitary and unsafe conditions and that 
limited inmate access to medical care, the Court-relying on the Eighth Amend-
ment-reaffirmed its long-standing commitment to protecting prisoners from 
harm.111 
In early America, a whole host of crimes-from murder and rape to adultery and 
sodomy to witchcraft and idolatry-were death-eligible. 118 Now, however, the 
only circumstances in which American courts will even consider death penalty 
prosecutions are those involving acts of first-degree murder or crimes against the 
state, such as terrorism or espionage. 119 And such capital prosecutions are 
uncommon. The last execution for espionage was in 1953,120 and capital charges 
today for first-degree murder are increasingly rare. 121 Death sentences and 
executions, the statistics show, are even rarer. 122 While the odds of a homicide 
offender being sentenced or put to death are increasingly small, 123 the chances of 
117. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928-34 (2011); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,203 (2007)("0ur 
legal system ... remains committed to guaranteeing that prisoner claims of illegal conduct by their custodians are 
fairly handled according to law."). 
118. James Gerard Eftink, Mental Retardation as a Bar to the Death Penalty: Who Bears the Burden of Proof?, 
75 Mo. L. REv. 537, 546 (2010). 
119. The Supreme Court has distinguished between crimes against individuals and crimes against the State and 
reserved judgment as to how the Court might rule as to the constitutionality of the death penalty regarding the 
latter. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008) ("We do not address, for example, crimes defining and 
punishing treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are offenses against the State. As it 
relates to crimes against individuals, though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances where the 
victim's life was not taken."). 
120. Sarah Frances Cable, An Unanswered Question in Kennedy v. Louisiana: How Should the Supreme Court 
Determine the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty for Espionage?, 70 LA. L. REv. 995, 1017-18 (20 10) (noting 
that "the last execution for espionage was the Rosenbergs in 1953" and that "no one has been put to death for 
treason since John Brown in 1859"). 
121. Eileen M. Connor, The Undermining Influence of the Federal Death Penalty on Capital Policymaking 
and Criminal Justice Administration in the States, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 149, 151 (2010) ("[T]he 
number of federal capital prosecutions remains low, and the vast majority of homicide prosecutions are 
undertaken by state criminal justice systems."); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the AU 
Concerning Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 416 (2010) (noting that the U.S. witnesses "between 
15,000 and 20,000 homicides per year" but that in 2007 "[f]ewer than 50 people were executed and slightly over 
I 00 people were sentenced to death nationwide"). 
122. Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REv. 227, 237 
(2012) ("[J]ust 10% of counties in the United States account for all death sentences imposed from 2004 to 
2009."); id. ("[S]ince 1976, only 15% of the counties in the United States have sentenced anyone to death who 
subsequently has been executed. Only fifty counties (1.6%) have sentenced five or more people to death whom 
their respective state ultimately executed.") (footnote omitted). 
123. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that, for 2007, there were 18,361 
homicides in the United States. Joseph E. Logan eta!., Homicides-United States, 1999-2007, in 60 MORBIDITY 
AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT. CDC HEALTH DISPARITIES AND INEQUALITIES REPORT-UNITED STATES, 20 II, at 
67--68 (Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention ed., Supp. 2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/ 
mmwrhtmVsu600 I a 14.htm. By comparison, the U.S. had forty-two executions in 2007, showing that the odds of a 
death-eligible offender actually being executed are extremely small. FAcrs ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 
64, at I. 
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receiving a death sentence increase dramatically depending on the defendant's 
race124 or the victim's race. 125 At the same time, a recent report by the National 
Research Council of the National Academies has called into question the social 
science research purporting to find that executions have a measurable deterrent 
effect on reducing homicides. 126 
Racial prejudice, meanwhile, continues to play a significant role in deciding 
who lives and who dies, as it long has in the United States. In the Framers' era, 
slaves were frequently executed to suppress or quell slave rebellions, and slave 
codes regularly made certain crimes death-eligible for blacks but not for whites. 127 
Of the 4,743 people lynched in the U.S. from 1882 to 1968, 3,446, or more than 
72 percent, were black. 128 Of the 3,334 persons executed for murder between 
1930 and 1968, almost half, 1,630, were black, with the vast majority of those 
executions-! ,231-taking place in the South. 129 Indeed, the I ynching of African 
Americans, as well as the disparity of treatment between whites and blacks in the 
124. Jules Epstein, Death-Worthiness and Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Case Charging, 19 TEMP. PoL. 
& CIV. RTs. L. REv. 389, 408 (2010) ("A study of 339 death verdict cases in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, with 
verdicts recorded between 1978 and 2000, showed 'the odds of receiving a death sentence at the weighing stage of 
the penalty trial were, on average, 3.8 times higher for black defendants than for similarly situated non-black 
defendants."') (quoting David C. Baldus eta!., Race and Proportionality Since McCleskey v. Kemp (1987): 
Different Actors with Mixed Strategies of Denial and Avoidance, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 143, 155 n.59 
(2007)). 
125. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Experience 
of the United States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1227, 1300 (2011) (''The data 
document white-victim and minority-accused/white-victim disparities in the imposition of death sentences among 
all death-eligible cases that are consistent with findings in numerous state systems on which comparable data are 
available."); Danielle Ward Mason, Racism on Our Juries: The Impossibility of Impartiality in Capital Cases, 12 
JoNES L. REV. 169, 184-85 (2008) ("'[I]n Florida, a defendant's odds of receiving a death sentence are 4.8 times 
higher if the victim was white than if the victim is black in similarly aggravated cases. In Illinois, the multiplier is 
4, in Oklahoma it is 4.3, in North Carolina 4.4, and in Mississippi it is 5.5."') (quoting Richard C. Dieter, The 
Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies, Who Decides, DEATH PENALTY INFORMXfiON CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-black-and-white-who-lives-who-dies-who-decides (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2012)); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 
1990-2008, 71 LA. L. REv. 647, 659 (2011) (''The relationship between the victim's race and death sentenc-
ing ... is very strong, and it is statistically significant."); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death 
Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-2007, 89 N.C. L. REv. 2119, 2144-45 (2011) (concluding that the odds of a 
death sentence for a suspect who kills a white person are three times higher than the odds for a suspect who kills a 
black person). 
126. NPJ'L REsEARCH COUNCIL Of THE NPJ'LACADS., DETERRENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 2 (2012). A press 
release that accompanied the release of the report emphasized: 
The key question, the report says, is whether capital punishment is less or more effective as a 
deterrent than alternative punishments, such as a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Yet 
none of the research that has been done accounted for the possible effect of noncapital 
punishments on homicide rates. 
Press Release, Current Research Not Sufficient to Assess Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty (Apr. 18, 2012), 
available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordiD= 13363. 
127. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 2, 151-53, 188-89,216-19,307. 
128. JOHN D. BESSLER, LEGACY OF VIOLENCE: LYNCH MOBS AND EXECUTIONS IN MINNESOTA 232 n.6 (2003). 
129. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 3. 
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criminal justice system, is what prompted some of the NAACP's earliest law-
reform activities. 130 The historical evidence of racial discrimination in the death 
penalty's infliction is not only strong, it is overwhelming. Of the 443 convicted 
rapists executed in the South from 1930 to 1968, the vastly predominant number, 
398, were black. 131 
The situation today is little changed, though the racial discrimination is much 
more covert. Prospective black jurors are often struck in a racially discriminatory 
manner, 132 and race-of-the-victim discrimination-with black-on-white homi-
cides punished the most severely-is well documented. 133 For example, in 
Mille r-EI v. Dretke, 134 the Supreme Court emphasized that out of twenty black 
members of the 108-person venire, only one sat in judgment in the case, with the 
prosecutor striking 91 percent of the eligible African-American venire members 
using peremptory challenges. 135 In a recent case in North Carolina, Superior Court 
Judge Gregory Weeks vacated a sentence of death under the state's Racial Justice 
Act 136 after finding a death row inmate's sentence was the product of racial bias. 137 
In accordance with the Act, the inmate, Marcus Robinson, was then resentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 138 
130. See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 18-20, 23, 210 
(1980) (discussing how the NAACP was formed in response to the failure oflaw enforcement officials to protect 
black communities from lynch mobs). 
131. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 3. 
132. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472,477-85 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231,240-41 (2005). 
133. FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 64, at 2 (noting that eighteen people have been executed for 
interracial murders where the defendant was white and the victim was black, but that 255 people have been 
executed where the defendant was black and the victim was white). 
134. Miller-El, 545 U.S. 231. 
135. ld. at 240-41. 
136. N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 15A-2010 to -2012 (2011). 
137. The North Carolina Superior Court Judge found that race was "a significant factor in decisions by 
prosecutors to exercise peremptory strikes"; that "[p]rosecutors intentionally used the race of venire members as a 
significant factor in decisions to exercise peremptory strikes"; and that the inmate's judgment "was sought or 
obtained on the basis of race." Order Granting Motion for Appropriate Relief at 163-67, State v. Robinson, No. 91 
CRS 23143 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 20 12), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/marcus_robinson_order. 
pdf. 
138. /d. at 167. As a result of that case, North Carolina lawmakers passed legislation to effectively repeal 
North Carolina's Racial Justice Act, then voted to override Gov. Bev Perdue's veto of the legislation they passed. 
The passage of the repeal legislation means that death row inmates in North Carolina are no longer allowed to use 
statewide statistics to demonstrate racial bias in the state's capital punishment system. In response to the change in 
North Carolina's law, Sarah Preston-the Policy Director for the American Civil Liberties Union of North 
Carolina-issued the following statement: 
This is a sad day for justice and for North Carolina. By gutting the Racial Justice Act, our 
legislature has turned its back on the overwhelming evidence of racial bias in our state's death 
penalty system. Politicians have decided they would rather sweep disturbing information under the 
rug than work to ensure that racial bias plays no role in North Carolina's death penalty. 
Press Release, ACLU-NC Condemns Veto Override of Racial Justice Act Repeal Bill (July 2, 2012), http:// 
www.aclu.org/racial-justice/aclu-nc-condemns-veto-override-racial-justice-act-repeal-bill. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has long railed against arbitrary punishments, 139 much 
like America's founders did in their time. 140 In Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 141 a 
2007 case adjudicating the legality of an award of punitive damages, the Supreme 
Court noted, for example, that its prior case law "emphasized the need to avoid an 
arbitrary determination of an award's amount." 142 The Court expressed special 
concern about "arbitrary punishments," what it described as "punishments that re-
flect not an 'application of law' but 'a decisionmaker's caprice. "' 143 While the U.S. 
Constitution and its Bill of Rights are national in scope, protecting American 
citizens regardless of race or geography, the death penalty is now largely a regional 
or local phenomenon, used in just a handful of geographic locations, mostly in the 
South. 144 The happenstance of where a crime occurs, as opposed to the nature of 
the crime itself, is thus often the determining factor in whether a particular criminal 
is executed. 
There is a stark difference between jurisdictions in the Deep South and 
elsewhere regarding death sentences and executions, as well as a documented 
disparity between urban and rural areas. 145 Although individual states have 
traditionally regulated criminal law, 146 the sheer arbitrariness of executions-
139. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416 (2003) ("The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor."); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he very words 'cruel and unusual 
punishments' imply condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments. And, as we now know, the 
English history of the Clause reveals a particular concern with the establishment of a safeguard against arbitrary 
punishments.") (citation omitted). 
140. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 238-39 (2005) (''The Framers of the Constitution understood the 
threat of 'judicial despotism' that could arise from 'arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions' without the 
benefit of a jury in criminal cases.") (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton)); BESSLER, CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 310 (explaining that Edmund Pendleton said the "Judiciary" was "necessary" to 
"prevent arbitrary punishments"); see also Stan L. Basler, Restorative Justice as a Third School of Criminology, 
33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 213, 214 (2008) (''The late eighteenth-century founders of the classical school were 
Jeremy Bentham (England) and Cesare Beccaria (Italy). They were motivated by concerns about the employment 
of severe and arbitrary punishments by nation-states."). 
141. 549 U.S. 346 (2007). 
142. Id. at 352. 
143. /d. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,416,418 (2003)). 
144. Katsuta, supra note 113, at 155 ("[M]ost of the executions after 1976 were carried out in the South."); see 
also Racial and Geographic Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001). See 
generally Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in 
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009) (discussing the geographic and racial disparities in Missouri 
executions). 
145. Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Monitoring Death Sentencing Decisions: The Challenges and 
Barriers to Equity, 34 HUMAN RIGHTS 2, 3 (2007) ("[O]ne study of different areas in Illinois found that the odds of 
a defendant's receiving a death sentence in highly populous Cook County were, on average, 83.6 percent lower 
than those for killing a victim in a similar homicide in rural areas of the state."). 
146. Ryan M. Goldstein, Improving Forensic Science Through State Oversight, 90 TEX. L. REv. 225, 232 
(20 II) ("In the American system of federalism, criminal law is traditionally reserved to the states under the police 
or welfare power."). 
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despite unsupported findings to the contrary147-have led some U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices to find executions unconstitutional in light of the Constitution's 
due process and equal protection guarantees, 148 the latter added in 1868 in the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 149 The U.S. Supreme Court has already interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the "arbitrary deprivation oflife," 150 emphasiz-
147. See, e.g., People v. Booker, 245 P.3d 366,409 (Cal. 2011) ('The circumstances and pace of California's 
executions do not make the death penalty arbitrary or unconstitutional."). 
148. James R. P. Ogloff & Sonia R. Chopra, Stuck in the Dark Ages: Supreme Court Decision Making and 
Legal Developments, 10 PsYCHOL. Pus. PoL'Y & L. 379, 397 (2004) ("In Justice Blackmun's view, the Baldus data 
provided enough evidence to show that the Georgia capital punishment system violates the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment II: The 
Eighth Amendment after Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REv. 62, 81 (1972) (discussing Furman and noting with 
respect to that decision that "some of the Justices seem to consider a small number of annual executions prima 
facie evidence of arbitrariness"); see also CaBins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143-44 (1994) (Biackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must be imposed fairly, 
and with reasonable consistency, or not at all ... and, despite the effort of the States and courts to devise legal 
formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains fraught with 
arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake."); id. at 1153 ("It seems that the decision whether a human 
being should live or die is so inherently subjective-rife with all of life's understandings, experiences, prejudices, 
and passions-that it inevitably defies the rationality and consistency required by the Constitution."); McCleskey 
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279-339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution was framed fundamentally as a 
bulwark against governmental power, and preventing the arbitrary administration of punishment is a basic ideal of 
any society that purports to be governed by the rule of law."); id. at 346 (Biackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment reminds us that discriminatory enforcement of States' criminal 
laws was a matter of great concern for the drafters."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that death penalty laws were "pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an 
ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and 
unusual' punishments"). 
149. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which fundamentally altered the 
relationship between the states and the federal government, undercuts Justice Scalia's "originalist" philosophy 
and his late-eighteenth-century-centric view of the Eighth Amendment. Because the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified in 1868, long after the Framers had all died, a reading of the U.S. Constitution must take into account the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection guarantees. A constitution, as Chief Justice John 
Marshall wrote, "is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it" and "is 
framed for ages to come," with exposures to "storms and tempests" to be expected. Cohens v. State of Virginia, 
19 U.S. 264,387 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). The provisions of the U.S. Constitution, many of which were written in 
general terms for future judges to construe, and which now include the Equal Protection Clause among them, must 
be harmonized, just as living judges must independently interpret the Constitution's text to the best of their 
abilities. Id. at 387-88, 391, 393, 398, 404, 414 (emphasizing that different provisions of the Constitution are 
"equally obligatory, and are to be equally respected"; that the Constitution is to be construed "to give effect to both 
provisions, as far as it is possible to reconcile them"; that the Court must "exercise our best judgment, and 
conscientiously ... perform our duty"; and that unconstitutional laws are "absolutely void"). Indeed, if the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause were interpreted today as those in the pre-Fourteenth Amendment era read it, 
African Americans would be entirely excluded from its protections. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 
28, at 188-89 (noting that an 1824 decision of the Virginia Supreme Court found that the state's prohibition 
against "cruel and unusual punishments" was "never ... contemplated, or considered, to extend to the whole 
population of the State," with the Virginia court noting: "Can it be doubted, that it not only was not intended to 
apply to our slave population, but that the free blacks and mulattoes were also not comprehended by it?''). 
Obviously, the Fourteenth Amendment-with its "equal protection" guarantee-now ensures that all Americans, 
regardless of race or color, are protected from "cruel and unusual punishments." 
150. South Carolina ex rei. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63, 72 (1915); Hodgson v. 
Vermont, 168 U.S. 262, 273 (1897); Jones v. Brim, 165 U.S. 180, 182 (1897); Giozza v. Tieman, 148 U.S. 657, 
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ing that "in the administration of criminal justice," the Fourteenth Amendment 
"requires that no different or higher punishment shall be imposed upon one than is 
imposed upon all for like offenses." 151 
The touchstone of due process is the protection of individuals against "arbi-
trary" government action, 152 and the Supreme Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence has likewise concerned itself with "arbitrary" government classifications 
that affect some citizens differently than others. 153 America's 200-plus years of 
discrimination and error-laden experience with capital punishment amply dem-
onstrates that executions--carried out in a mostly random, haphazard fashion 
throughout the nation's history 154-run afoul of both due process and equal 
protection principles. 155 
662 (1893); Yesler v. Bd. of Harbor Line Comm'rs, 146 U.S. 646,655 (1892); Ex parte Converse, 137 U.S. 624, 
631-32 (1891); Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232,238 (1890); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,448-49 
(1890); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 (1887); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 367 (1886); Missouri 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884); Hagar v. 
Reclamation Dist. No. 108, Ill U.S. 701, 707 (1884); accord BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586 
(1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
151. Converse, 137 U.S. at 632; Kemmler, 136 U.S. at449; see also Barbier, 113 U.S. at 31 ("(N]o different or 
higher punishment should be imposed upon one than such as is prescribed to all for like offenses."). 
152. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528,543 (2005); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,467 
(2001); Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); 
Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453,465 (1991); Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491,495 (1985); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123 
(1889); see also Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 834 (1994) ("[C]riminal 
procedural protections such as the rights to counsel and proof beyond a reasonable doubt are both necessary and 
appropriate to protect the due process rights of parties and prevent the arbitrary exercise of ... power."). 
153. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 
967 (1982); Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., Neb., 260 U.S. 441,445 (1923); see also Bankers Life and 
Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988) ("[A]rbitrary and irrational discrimination violates the Equal 
Protection Clause under even our most deferential standard of review."); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648, 660 (1981) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, introduced the 
constitutional requirement of equal protection, prohibiting the States from acting arbitrarily or treating similarly 
situated persons differently .... "). 
154. Jurists themselves have long expressed concern over arbitrary executions. E.g., People v. Gleckler, 
411 N.E.2d 849, 856 (Ill. 1980) ("The State must avoid arbitrary executions by adequately defining capital 
offenses, by suitably directing sentencing discretion, and by ensuring adequate judicial review of cases in which 
the death sentence is imposed."). On the international level, the United Nations has a Special Rapporteur whose 
duty is to issue reports concerning "extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions." Hinojosa v. Texas, 4 S.W.3d 
240, 252 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The current Special Rapporteur is Christof Heyns, a South African law 
professor and human rights activist who has called the death penalty "systemic and organized violence by the 
state." Corydon Ireland, Death Penalty in Decline, HARV. GAZETIE, June 27, 2012, available at http:// 
news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/20 12/06/death-penalty-in-decline/. 
!55. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ("Our cases have recognized successful 
equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally 
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in 
treatment.") (citation omitted); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) ("Equal protection applies as well to the 
manner of its exercise."). See generally AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE 
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION (James R. Acker et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003); BESSLER, 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 310. But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961) ("[W]e 
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IV. THE AMBIVALENCE TOWARD EXECUTIONS IN THE FOUNDING ERA 
The sordid history of America's death penalty-which many of the Founders 
themselves sought to curtail 156-shows Americans' now centuries-old ambiva-
lence toward executions. 157 In the same era in which John Hancock called for an 
end to the punishments of "cropping and branding, as well as that of the Public 
Whipping Post," 158 America's founders questioned the death penalty's use-if not 
for every crime, then at least for many offenses. 159 In eighteenth-century Virginia, 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison sought to restrict executions to cases of 
murder and treason, 160 a proposal that, in 1785, lost by just a single vote. 161 
Madison's college classmate and close friend William Bradford-the second 
Attorney General of the United States-authored an essay in 1793 titled "An 
Enquiry How Far the Punishment of Death is Necessary in Pennsylvania."162 In 
that essay, written shortly after the ratification of the U.S. Bill of Rights, Bradford 
advocated for the death penalty's abolition for all crimes except murder. And as for 
murder, Bradford was perfectly willing to entertain the possibility that evidence 
might later show that the death penalty for that crime was not an appropriate 
punishment either. 163 
To be sure, the Framers' views were diverse and often changed with the times. 
While some founders, like John Adams and John Jay, had fewer moral qualms with 
have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas 
and that territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite."). 
156. Many early American legislators were inspired to reform death penalty laws by Cesare Beccaria's treatise, 
On Crimes and Punishments. In a 1786 letter written in Philadelphia by James Madison's friend, William 
Bradford, Jr., to Luigi Castiglioni, an Italian botanist who visited America in the 1780s, Bradford wrote this of 
Beccaria's treatise: "One must attribute mainly to this excellent book the honor of this revolution in our penal 
code. The name of Beccaria has become familiar in Pennsylvania, his authority has become great, and his 
principles have spread among all classes of persons and impressed themselves deeply in the hearts of our 
citizens." LUIGI CASTIGLIONI'S VIAGGIO: TRAVELS IN THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, 1785-87, 313-14 
(Antonio Pace ed. & trans. 1983). By the time French writer Alexis de Tocqueville toured America in the 1830s, 
he observed that "the Americans have almost expunged capital punishment from their codes." Robert J. Cottro1, 
Finality with Ambivalence: The American Death Penalty's Uneasy History, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1641, 1651 (2004) 
(book review). Tocqueville arrived in America in 1831 and published his acclaimed book, Democracy in America, 
in 1835. MICHAEL DROLET, TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL REFORM 9, 20 (2003). 
157. The Framers' attempts to curtail executions in American society are detailed in my recent book on the 
subject. See generally BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 50-55, 57-161. 
158. ld. 
159. ld. at66-161. 
160. See id. at 141-45. In a letter to Jefferson penned in 1776, Edmund Pendleton wrote: "Our Criminal 
System of Law has hitherto been too Sanguinary, punishing too many crimes with death, I confess." ld. at 141. 
161. ld. at 145, 156-57. 
162. ld. at85. 
163. ld. at 85-91. For anyone who thought a prison sentence too lenient, Bradford suggested that his readers 
look "into the narrow cells prepared for the more atrocious offenders" and consider the "hard labor" they would 
perform and the "coarse fare" they would subsist on during their incarceration. He also encouraged readers to 
consider that offenders would "languish in the solitude of a prison"-"cut off' from family-as they lived out 
their "tedious days" and their long nights of "feverish anxiety." BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, 
at90. 
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executions, they still struggled with their use in some circumstances. 164 Others 
were even more circumspect. 165 James Wilson, a signer of both the Declaration of 
Independence and the U.S. Constitution, regularly referred to Cesare Beccaria's 
abolitionist writings 166 and noted with pride: "How few are the crimes-how few 
are the capital crimes, known to the laws of the United States, compared with those 
known to the laws of England!"167 Wilson also said that "cruelty" is the "parent of 
slavery" and called "cruel" punishments "dastardly and contemptible."168 Benja-
min Franklin-America's senior statesman-himself pondered in 1785: "To put a 
man to death for an offence which does not deserve death, is it not murder?"169 
And even military leaders, such as George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, 
came to believe that executions were far too frequent. 170 
As state penitentiaries were built following the adoption of the U.S. Constitution 
and the ratification of the Bill of Rights, 171 America's founders seemed to have 
even less of an appetite for executions. 172 Writing in the 1820s, Madison spoke 
of his attraction to "penitentiary discipline" as a substitute for "the cruel inflictions 
so disgraceful to penal codes."173 In 1823, Madison even wrote one Kentucky 
correspondent, G. F. H. Crockett, "I should not regret a fair and full trial of the 
entire abolition of capital punishments by any State willing to make it: tho' I do not 
see the injustice of such punishments in one case at least."174 Inspired by 
Beccaria's popular 1764 essay, On Crimes and Punishments, 175 Jefferson, too, 
emphasized in 1821 that Beccaria and others "had satisfied the reasonable world 
of the unrightfulness and inefficacy of the punishment of crimes by death."176 
Dr. Benjamin Rush-a signer of the Declaration of Independence-specifically 
called death "an improper punishment for any crime" and advocated for the death 
164. See id. at 56. John Jay expressed his views as follows: "As to murderers, I think it not only lawful for 
government, but that it is the duty of government, to put them to death." /d. While President John Adams approved 
of some executions, he disapproved others and personally owned a copy of Beccaria's book, On Crimes and 
Punishments. /d. at SO, 56. 
165. Many efforts were made in the founding era to curtail the use of executions for various crimes. See id. at 
62, 76,78-79,86-89,139-46,156-67,193,257,272,274. 
166. /d. at 51. 
167. /d. at 52. 
168. /d. at 52-53. 
i69. /d. ai 123. 
170. See id. at 126-38. In a letter to her husband John in 1797, Abigail Adams pondered what might happen "if 
the states go on to abolish capital punishment." /d. at 62. John and Abigail's son, John Quincy Adams, who 
studied the death penalty as a young man and who became the sixth President of the United States, would go on to 
support efforts to abolish capital punishment. /d. at 63-64, 273-74. 
171. /d. at 269-70. 
172. See id. at 85-91, I SO, 296. 
173. /d. at 296. 
174. /d. at 158. 
175. See John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria s Vision: The Enlightenment, Americas Death Penalty, and the 
Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. PoL'Y 195, 196 (2009). 
176. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 145. 
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penalty's total abolition. 177 Thomas Paine-the author of Common Sense and often 
called the "Father of the American Revolution"-also opposed executions, calling 
them "barbarous" and "cruel spectacles." 178 While executions in the founding era 
could not be fairly described as "unusual," 179 much evidence exists that, in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many Americans already viewed execu-
tions as "cruel" in the ordinary parlance of the day. 180 
V. THE PuBLIC'S AND JURISTS' AMBIVALENCE TOWARD EXECUTIONS 
Americans have always been-and still remain-highly ambivalent about 
executions. Decades ago, executions came to be seen by American civic leaders as 
brutalizing spectacles and were relegated to the confines of prisons. 181 Sometimes, 
state laws even went so far as to bar reporters from attending or reporting the 
details of executions. 182 The abandonment of mandatory death sentences in favor 
of discretionary ones was due, in part, to jurors' antipathy toward executions 
themselves. 183 After Tennessee gave juries discretion over whether to impose a 
death sentence for murder in 1838, other states followed suit, and by 1963 all states 
had done away with mandatory death sentences. 184 Today, the number of death 
sentences and executions is down nationwide, including in Texas. 185 A recent 
report of the Death Penalty Information Center titled A Crisis of Confidence: 
Americans' Doubts About the Death Penalty, concluded: "People are deeply 
concerned about the risk of executing the innocent, about the fairness of the 
process, and about the inability of capital punishment to accomplish its basic 
177. /d. at 70; see also id. at 66-84 (detailing Dr. Benjamin Rush's advocacy). 
178. /d. at 108. 
179. In early America, executions were, after all, the mandatory-and thus the usual or standard-punishment 
for certain crimes. See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 747 (1948) (noting that a 1790 act of the First 
Congress provided in part that, upon conviction, those committing murder "shall suffer death"). 
180. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 52-53, 61, 86, 108-9, 122, 125, 130, 135-36, 146, 
159--60, 181, 183-84, 296 (discussing the American founders' use of the term "cruel"). In the debate in the First 
Congress over the "cruel and unusual punishments" language, one opponent of the proposed language, after 
discussing the punishments of hanging, whipping, and ear cropping, even explicitly mused about whether, in the 
future, they might be "prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?" /d. at 186. 
181. See generally JOHN D. BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK: MIDNIGHT EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 40-80 (1997) 
[hereinafter BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK]. 
182. John D. Bessler, The "Midnight Assassination Law" and Minnesota's Anti-Death Penalty Movement, 
1849-1911,22 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 577,666-77, 701-D3, 707 (1996). 
183. Omar Malone, Capital Punishment Statutes and the Administration of Criminal Justice: (Un)Equal 
Protection Under the Law!, 15 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 87, 92 (1990) ("At least since the revolution, American 
jurors, have with some regularity, discarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a death sentence 
was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict."). 
184. Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 283,289 n.l5 (1991). 
185. David McCord, What's Messing with Texas Death Sentences?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 601, 601 (2011) 
("During the peak five-year period for Texas death sentences-1992-1996-an average of 42 per year were 
pronounced; by contrast, in the most recent five-year period-2005-2009-an average of only 14 death sentences 
per year were handed down. The drop from 42 to 14 per year represents a 70% decline."). 
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purposes." 186 
The myriad ways in which executions have been carried out since the founding 
era indicate that Americans have never been all that comfortable with what 
happens at executions. 187 Hangings in the public square at midday gradually gave 
way to non-public, nighttime executions behind thick prison walls. 188 Indeed, 
more than eighty percent of American executions once took place between the 
hours of 11:00 p.m. and 7:30 a.m., 189 with one minute after midnight becoming-
for a period--one of the most popular times for executions. 190 State laws 
restricting the presence of television cameras and limiting the attendance of 
reporters at executions also suggests a deep sense of shame about executions. 191 
Even methods of execution-the way we choose to kill the condemned-have 
morphed from gibbeting and drawing and quartering, to hangings and firing 
squads, to electrocutions and gas chambers, to what we have today: more clinical 
lethal injection protocols. 192 
When one examines the pronouncements of U.S. Supreme Court Justices-
especially either nearing or after retirement-it is striking how blunt many are 
about the lack of necessity for, and the intractable problems associated with, 
capital punishment. Dissenting in 1994 from the denial of certiorari in Callins v. 
Collins, 193 Justice Blackmun famously wrote: "From this day forward, I no longer 
shall tinker with the machinery of death." 194 Citing the arbitrariness and unfairness 
of death sentences as well as the Court's failure to adhere to the commands of the 
U.S. Constitution, Justice Blackmun candidly concluded: "I feel morally and 
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has 
failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural 
rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent 
constitutional deficiencies." 195 Blackmun issued that opinion on February 22, 
1994,196 just months before he stepped down from the nation's highest court. 197 
186. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: AMERICANS' DOUBTS ABOUT 
THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2007). 
187. DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLffiON 271 (2010) 
("A civilized aesthetic is often invoked in cases concerned with execution methods and procedures-since 
executions are dangerously prone to generate the sights, sounds, and smells of physical violence and gruesome 
images of bodily distortion and disfigurement, all of which are disturbing to refined sensibilities."). 
188. See generally BESSLER, DEATH IN THE DARK, supra note 181, at 23-97. 
189. Jd. at 6, 213-20. 
190. Jd. at 5. 
191. See generally id. at 40-129, 163-205. 
192. John P. Rutledge, The Definitive Inhumanity of Capital Punishment, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 283, 284 
(1998). 
193. 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
194. /d.at1145. 
195. Jd. 
196. Jd. at 1143. 
197. See Retirement of Justice B1ackmun, 512 U.S. I, VII (June 30, 1994). Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
noted that it was Justice Blackmun's last session./d. 
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Other Supreme Court Justices, both current and retired, have also been circum-
spect. At a 2001 speech, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg-who expressed support for 
a moratorium on executions in Maryland--commented, "I have yet to see a death 
case, among the dozens coming to the Supreme Court on eve of execution 
petitions, in which the defendant was well represented at trial." 198 After Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. retired, his biographer asked him whether, given the chance, 
he would change any of his votes. "Yes," Justice Powell replied, "McCleskey v. 
Kemp." 199 Powell had authored that five-to-four decision, providing the deciding 
vote that sealed Warren McCleskey's fate. 200 And Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
now retired, has also been critical of the way in which capital punishment laws are 
administered. At a speech in 2001 to the Minnesota Women Lawyers, O'Connor 
noted: "Serious questions are being raised about whether the death penalty is being 
fairly administered in this country."201 O'Connor also emphasized that "problems" 
in the death penalty's administration had "become more apparent," noting that 
"[p]erhaps most alarming among these is the fact that if statistics are any 
indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be 
executed. "202 
Justice John Paul Stevens is the most recent Justice to express his disdain for 
executions. In Five Chiefs, a book published shortly after his retirement from the 
bench, Justice Stevens wrote that the Court's judgment in Baze "had a critical 
impact on my views about the constitutionality of capital punishment."203 Chief 
Justice Roberts's draft opinion, Stevens wrote, "convinced" him that there was no 
longer a persuasive justification for death sentences.Z04 Between 1976 and 2008, 
Stevens noted, "the increasing use of life sentences without the possibility of 
parole" had changed the nature of the debate and "eliminated" the justifications for 
the death penalty.205 The Court's 1976 decisions upholding capital punishment 
laws, Stevens wrote, were predicated on the notion "the states had narrowed the 
category of death-eligible offenses and would enforce procedures that would 
198. Kenneth Williams, Does Strickland Prejudice Defendants on Death Row?, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 1459, 
1459 n.7 (2009); see also James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better: Justice Stevens and the 
Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1673 n.282 (2006). 
199. Adam Liptak, A New Look at Race When Death Is Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, at AIO, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/us/29bar.html. 
200. Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate Is Executed After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991 /09/26/us/georgia-i ornate-is-executed-after -chaotic-legal-move.html. 
201. Williams, supra note 198, at 1459 n.7. 
202. San jay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 
28 ST. LoUis U. Pus. L. REv. 351,391 (2009). 
203. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 214 (2011). 
204. !d. at 218. As Justice Stevens wrote: "John Roberts's opinion in Baze, to my surprise, convinced me that 
the Court had already rejected the premise that the death penalty serves a meaningful retributive purpose. His 
review of our earlier cases effectively demonstrated that the Eighth Amendment has been construed to prohibit 
needless suffering and significant risks of harm to the defendant." /d. 
205. /d. at217. 
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minimize the risk of error and the risk that the race of the defendant or the race of 
the victim would play a role in the sentencing decision."206 But Justice Stevens had 
come to personally "regret" his vote in 1976 to uphold the constitutionality of the 
Texas law that had authorized so many death sentences/07 with Stevens emphasiz-
ing that "the finality of the death penalty always includes the risk that the state may 
put an innocent person to death. "208 
The Supreme Court has upheld life sentences in multiple cases, with life-without-
parole ("LWOP") sentences emerging as a viable alternative to capital punishment. 
In Harmelin v. Michigan,209 the Court upheld an offender's LWOP sentence for 
possessing more than 650 grams of cocaine.Z10 In Ewing v. Califomia211 and a 
companion case, Lockyer v. Andrade,212 the Supreme Court also upheld sentences 
imposed under California's "three strikes law" in the face of Eighth Amendment 
challenges to it.213 In Ewing, the Court upheld a twenty-five-year-to-life sentence 
under California's three strikes law after the offender stole three golf clubs worth 
$399 each from a pro shop? 14 And in Lockyer, handed down the same day as 
Ewing, the Court affirmed an offender's twenty-five-year-to-life sentence under 
California's three strikes law for stealing videotapes from a K-Mart store.Z15 
Although the Court has occasionally struck down LWOP sentences,216 such 
sentences have become increasingly common217 in America's criminal justice 
206. Id. at 216. 
207. /d. at 215-16. 
208. /d. at 217. As Justice Stevens noted: "In the last four decades, more than one hundred death-row inmates 
have been exonerated, a number of them on the basis of DNA evidence." /d. 
209. 501 u.s. 957 (1991). 
210. /d. at 995 (reasoning that "a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual" does not "becom[e] so 
simply because it is 'mandatory"'). 
211. 538 U.S. II (2003). 
212. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
213. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-31; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66-77. 
214. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28-31; id. at 30-31 ("We hold that Ewing's sentence of 25 years to life in prison, 
imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and 
therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments."); id. at 32 
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("Because I agree that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, I concur in the judgment."); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
("Because the plurality concludes that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments, I concur in the judgment."). 
215. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66-77. 
216. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (striking down mandatory life-without-parole sentences for 
juvenile homicide offenders); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide); 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 279 (1983) (reversing a life sentence for a recidivist convicted of a seventh 
non-violent felony, writing a worthless $100 check on a non-existent account). 
217. CONNIE DE LA VEGA ETAL., CENTER FOR LAW & GLOBAL JUSTICE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: U.S. SENTENCING 
PRACTICES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 22 (2012) ("Forty-nine of [fifty] U.S. states, the United States, and the District of 
Columbia allow life without parole sentences. Six states and the United States require all life sentences to be 
without the possibility of parole."); id. ("LWOP is mandatory upon conviction for at least one specified offense in 
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system218 and are frequently authorized by legislatures and permitted by the 
courts.Z19 Indeed, it is well documented that support for capital punishment falls 
precipitously when LWOP is offered as a sentencing alternative.Z20 
CONCLUSION 
When the mounting evidence regarding the death penalty's actual operation is 
reviewed in total, it seems clear that the U.S. Supreme Court will soon have to 
address the constitutionality of executions once more. It did so in 1972221 and in 
1976222 though when it will do so again is up to the Court itself to decide. The 
Justices, exercising their judicial independence, must ultimately interpret the 
Eighth Amendment's text, which unequivocally prohibits "cruel and unusual 
punishments," making no carve-out or exception for the punishment of death. If 
the "cruel and unusual punishments" language is fairly considered in light of the 
factual evidence surrounding the death penalty's operation, the Court should find 
executions to be unconstitutional.223 
But what about Justice Antonio Scalia's "originalist" approach, which focuses 
on trying to divine what was or was not deemed acceptable in the eighteenth-
century, in the era of America's founders? Although the words "capital," "life" and 
"limb" certainly appear in the U.S. Constitution, as Justice Scalia is fond of 
pointing out, 224 those provisions-in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments225-
were drafted as constitutional protections for individuals when mandatory death 
sentences were still the legal norm.Z26 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
which must be read with the Eighth Amendment's absolute prohibition against 
"cruel and unusual punishments," did not etch in stone an archaic penal code for all 
27 states. LWOP is mandatory in many states for a murder conviction, and in at least eight, it is mandatory upon 
conviction under a recidivism statute."). 
218. DE LA VEGA ETAL., supra note 217, at 8 (''The number of prisoners serving LWOP sentences is more than 
41,000 in the United States. In contrast, there are 59 serving such sentences in Australia, 41 in England, and 37 in 
the Netherlands. The size of the U.S.'s LWOPpopulation dwarfs other countries' on a per capita basis as well; it is 
51 times Australia's, 173 times England's, and 59 times the Netherlands'.") (citations omitted). Life sentences 
themselves have grown exponentially in the U.S. over the last few decades. /d. at 17 ("The number of prisoners 
serving life sentences quadrupled between 1984 and 2008, from 34,000 to more than 140,000. The number of 
prisoners serving life sentences in federal prisons grew tenfold from 410 to 4,200 during the same time period."). 
219. See Hong v. Sec'y Dep't ofCorr., No. 11-13728,2012 WL 2141821, at *3 (lith Cir. June 14, 2012) ("A 
sentence of life without parole has been affirmed by different courts, including the Supreme Court."). 
220. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 197 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("General public support for the 
death penalty also plummets when the survey subjects are given the alternative oflife without parole."); O'Dell v. 
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 172 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he decline in the number of death sentences 
has been attributed to the fact that juries in Virginia must now be informed of the life-without-parole 
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time. For anyone who remains unconvinced, it should not go unnoticed that 
although the Bill of Rights uses the word "limb," U.S. courts no longer allow a 
person's "limb" to be cut off.227 If a "limb" can no longer be taken from an 
offender, why, one might reasonably ask, does the Supreme Court still construe the 
Constitution to allow a "life" to be taken? 
Although maximum-security prisons now exist to house violent offenders, 
American executions still continue to be carried out sporadically. When they 
occur, they are the result of an arbitrary and racially discriminatory system, 228 all 
of which runs counter to the basic principles of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 229 Indeed, despite all the efforts by legislators and the courts since 
Furman, the death penalty remains as arbitrary and as problematic as ever. 230 To 
borrow Justice Potter Stewart's words from his opinion in Furman, lightning 
continues to strike a "capriciously selected random handful" of those sentenced to 
die. 231 If Eighth Amendment case law, as a whole, is ever to be reconciled, capital 
punishment must be declared unconstitutional. Corporal punishments such as the 
pillory and the whipping post have already been rejected in our penal system/32 
and the same humanitarian impulse that leads judges to prohibit such harsh 
corporal punishments should lead them to declare executions unlawful. 233 Execu-
tions are no longer necessary as LWOP sentences are now readily available to 
protect the public from heinous offenders. 
For the time being, the gears of America's badly broken machinery of death 
grind on. The facts, though, unmistakably show that the death penalty is "cruel and 
227. /d. at 343-44. As noted earlier, even Justice Scalia-calling himself a "faint-hearted originalist"-has 
indicated that he himself would no longer tolerate a harsh corporal punishment such as flogging. /d. at 327 
(citation omitted). 
228. The arbitrariness and racial bias in America's death penalty system is in direct contravention of both the 
Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection guarantees. See U.S. 
CoNST. amends. VIII, XIV; see also Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999) ("[W]e have said that the 
Eighth Amendment requires that a sentence of death not be imposed arbitrarily."). In a recent book review, newly 
retired Justice John Paul Stevens expressed his own concerns about arbitrariness this way: "Arbitrariness in the 
imposition of the death penalty is exactly the type of thing the Constitution prohibits, as Justice Lewis Powell, 
Justice Potter Stewart, and I explained in our joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). We wrote that capital 
sentencing procedures must be constructed to avoid the random or capricious imposition of the penalty, akin to the 
risk of being struck by lightning." John Paul Stevens, A Struggle with the Police & the Law, N.Y. REv. OF BooKS 
(Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/apr/05/struggle-police-law/. "Today," Stevens 
wrote, "one of the sources of such arbitrariness is the decision of state prosecutors-which is not subject to 
review-to seek a sentence of death." /d. 
229. The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, explicitly requires "equal protection of the laws." U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
230. Lindsey S. Vann, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 
45 U. RICH. L. REv. 1255, 1288 (2011) ("History has repeated itself. The capital punishment system in America is 
as arbitrary as it was leading up to Furman."). 
231. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
232. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 258. 
233. /d. at 344. 
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unusual" in both a legal and factual sense.234 Not only is the system riddled with 
error35 and discrimination,236 but executions fly in the face of what the Supreme 
Court itself says the Eighth Amendment is designed to do: protect prisoners?37 
The Supreme Court has long emphasized that the touchstone of the Eighth 
Amendment is "human dignity,'ms yet death sentences and executions-which 
deprive inmates of their lives-run directly counter to that principle?39 Indeed, 
death sentences cause far more psychological and emotional trauma than other acts 
that have been found to be Eighth Amendment violations.240 The arbitrariness of 
234. See, e.g., J. Trout Lowen, Is the Death Penalty Unconstitutional?, MINN. 28-31 (Winter 2012), available 
at http://www.minnesotaalumni.org/s/1118/social.aspx?sid= 1118&gid= I &pgid=3387&cid=5499&ecid= 
5499&crid=O&calpgid=3357&calcid=5509 (containing Q&A with the author in the University of Minnesota 
alumni magazine as to the unconstitutionality of executions); Rosalyn Park & Robin Phillips, The Death Penalty: 
Cruel? Unusual?, THE HENNEPIN LAWYER (Mar. 2012), available at http://hennepin.membershipsoftware.org/ 
article_content.asp?edition= !&section= 147&article= 1606 (detailing problems with America's death penalty 
and putting them into the context of international law); BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 334, 338 
(discussing the concept of human dignity). 
235. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 (2000) (finding 
an overall error rate of sixty-eight percent in capital cases). 
236. David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An 
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1738 (1998) 
("[T]he problem of arbitrariness and discrimination in the administration of the death penalty is a matter of 
continuing concern and is not confined to southern jurisdictions."); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race 
and Death Sentencing inNonh Carolina, /980-2007,89 N.C. L. REv. 2119,2145 (2011) ("Overall, for homicides 
in North Carolina from 1980 to 2007, the odds of a death sentence for those who are suspected of killing Whites 
are approximately three times higher than the odds of a death sentence for those suspected of killing Blacks."). 
237. BESSLER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, supra note 28, at 219-21. 
238. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (20 II) ("Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in 
all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment."). Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) ("While the prevailing practice of 
individualized sentencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a constitutional 
imperative, we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circum-
stances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of 
death."), with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment demands more than that a 
challenged punishment be acceptable to contemporary society. The Court also must ask whether it comports with 
the basic concept of human dignity at the core of the Amendment."). 
239. See Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1080 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("I 
adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments .... One of the reasons I adhere to this view is my belief that the 'physical 
and mental suffering' inherent in any method of execution is so 'uniquely degrading to human dignity' that, 
when combined with the arbitrariness by which capital punishment is imposed, the trend of enlightened opinion, 
and the availability of less severe penological alternatives, the death penalty is always unconstitutional."); see 
also Lufs Roberto Barroso, Here, There, and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the 
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Judicial Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United States, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 221, 240-41 (2011) ("As 
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executions-and the documented racial prejudice associated with them--only 
compounds the existing incongruity in the Court's Eighth Amendment law. 
Death sentences and executions have declined in number over the years241 and 
are now restricted largely to a few states and are mostly concentrated in just a few 
counties?42 While executions in the founding era used to be the mandatory--or 
usual-punishment for certain crimes, executions have become extremely unusual 
as LWOP statutes have risen in popularity.243 In America today, even as legislative 
efforts to abolish the death penalty in places such as Kansas, Maryland, and Ohio 
continue apace,244 LWOP sentences have far eclipsed death sentences in terms of 
their usage for punishing first-degree murderers?45 Thus, while death sentences 
and executions are now unusual, LWOP sentences have become the public's 
preferred--or usual-means to punish first-degree murderers. The only way, in 
fact, in which the country's Eighth Amendment case law can ever truly become 
principled and internally consistent is by a declaration that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional. Until that day arrives, the Supreme Court-in deciding indi-
vidual death penalty cases-will just be tinkering here and there with the state's 
ultimate sanction. 
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